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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All parties to the proceedings below are identified in the caption on appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court granted the Hartford's initial petition for interlocutory appeal, and 
subsequently transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Prior to the transfer, 
jurisdiction in this Court was proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The 
decision of the Court of Appeals was issued on March 20, 2003, and is included in the 
Appendix. This Court's order granting certiorari is proper under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5), which confer sole jurisdiction upon this Court to resolve 
judgments and rulings of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issue is presented to this Court for review: 
Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the term "causes of action arising out of 
personal injury" in Utah's Survival Statute is limited solely to "tort" actions, and therefore 
the Survival Statute had no affect on the UIM claim of an injured party who died of 
unrelated causes prior to judgment or settlement? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
reviewed de novo. Cook v. Zions First National Bank, 2002 UT 105 ^ 8, 57 P.3d 1084. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was briefed by both parties in connection 
with The Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment, and at the Court of Appeals. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute is determinative of the outcome of this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann §78-11-12(1). 
1 
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(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or death 
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate 
upon the death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured 
person or the personal representatives or heirs of the person who 
died have a cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
representative of the wrongdoer for special and general damages, 
subject to subsection (l)(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies as a result 
of a cause other than the injury received as a result of the wrongful 
act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal representative or 
heirs of that person are entitled to receive no more than the out-of-
pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of that person as a result of 
his injury. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This case arises out of a claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Dorothy 
Berkemeir, the UIM claimant, died of causes unrelated to the underlying automobile 
accident before her UIM claim was resolved, and a dispute then arose as to the effect of 
Utah's Survival Statute on the UIM benefits. 
Berkemeir's estate filed a complaint, after which the parties stipulated to certain 
facts, and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled that the 
Survival Statute did not affect Berkemeir's claim for UIM benefits (R. 138), and entered 
an order granting the Estate's motion for partial summary judgment and denying 
Hartford's motion for summary judgment. (R. 189-196). ^ 
This Court granted Hartford's petition for interlocutory appeal, and transferred the 
case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, and this 
i 
Court granted certiorari. 
2 
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I * c HR>UI<IIK,C contract 
issued b> die iiaitioid {/tin* i 'ohw/ , . iierkemeif s P_-iK; included 1T1M u*1 erage with 
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v . ) Sustained b\ an insured, .in-' 
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B< ;rk « :m< :ii < i< jmj « ided the UIM Policy's $100,000 limits. (R. 22). I he 1 lartford 
agreed that Beikemeif s damages exceeded the $50,000 she received from Mcxand--: - ••* 
it did not believi .;»* ihe\ ^ . M ^ . I * . k.... .. -
: ;
 '• - \ ne^v* .i. ia-a lu an expedited 
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party could demand arbitration unilaterally; the consent of both parties was required. (R. 
74)).' 
On August 15, 1997, prior to the scheduled arbitration, Berkemeir died of causes 
unrelated to the automobile accident. (R. 22). After her death, Hartford withdrew its 
consent to arbitrate, believing that because Berkemeir died of causes unrelated to the 
accident, Utah's Survival Statute limited any claim that her Estate could assert to "out-of-
pocket expenses," which were less than the $50,000 that Berkemeir had already received 
from Allstate. (R. 23, 25-26). The Estate reduced its settlement demand after 
Berkemeir's death to $45,580, but the parties did not reach an agreement, and the Estate 
filed the present action. (R. 1,23). Opinion f^ 3. 
The parties stipulated to certain facts, and filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. (R. 82-116). The trial court ruled that because UIM benefits are based upon a 
first-party insurance contract, they are unaffected by Utah's Survival Statute. (R. 191-
195). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Opinion^ 17. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Utah's Survival Statute does not 
affect a claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Under this Court's precedent, whether 
an insured is "legally entitled to recover" against the underlying tortfeasor ~ as required 
1
 An arbitration was originally scheduled for July 21, 1997. As is typical when the extent 
of personal injury damages is at issue, the Hartford requested an independent medical 
examination. Berkemeir failed to appear at the first IME, and both the IME and 
arbitration were rescheduled. The new date for the arbitration was September 23, 1997. 
4 
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to recover UIM benefits — depends on whether the insured has a 'Viable" claim against 
the tortfeasor under applicable law. In this case, Berkemeir5s death precluded a viable 
claim against the tortfeasor (except for out-of-pocket expenses, the full amount of which 
she had already received). 
The Court of Appeals, however, applied a wholly new test, concluding that 
Berkemeir was legally entitled to recover against the tortfeasor because Hartford had 
"settled" by acknowledging that Alexander was an underinsured tortfeasor, and agreeing 
to arbitrate the extent of Berkemeir5s damages. This conclusion was patently erroneous, 
as these circumstances fall far short of essential terms of a settlement. 
The Court of Appeals further erred in its interpretation of the term "arising out of 
personal injury55 in the Survival Statute. The court first failed to consider the plain 
meaning of the phrase, and then compounded the omission by construing it as limited 
solely to "tort55 claims, a reading that can only be achieved by rewriting the statute. 
Finally, the Court erred by holding that, because a claim for UIM benefits is 
contract-based, it automatically cannot "arise out of personal injury.55 This conclusion is 
not supported by citation to any authority, and in fact holds directly opposite to the only 
case on point cited by the court. By its very nature, a UIM claim derives from, exists 
because of, is measured by, is co-extensive with, and is inextricable from, the underlying 
personal injury action against the tortfeasor. Indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that 
a UIM carrier "stands in the shoes55 of a tortfeasor. Under these circumstances, it is 
irrelevant that UIM benefits are provided through an insurance contract; they clearly 
"arise out of5 personal injury, and Berkemeir's UIM claims did not survive her death. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
I. UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
Underinsured motorist coverage is a required (but waivable) component to 
automobile liability insurance policies under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-
302, -305. "Underinsured motorist coverage . . . provides coverage for covered persons 
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of underinsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death." Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-305(9). 
The purpose of UIM coverage is to "provide protection to the insured against 
damages caused by a negligent motorist as if the motorist had another liability policy in 
the amount of the underinsured policy." 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance § 37, 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 845 
P.2d 519 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). UIM coverage is considered to "give a personal 
injury claimant access to insurance protection to compensate for the damages that would 
have been recoverable if the underinsured motorist had maintained an adequate policy of 
liability insurance." Id. 
As the Court of Appeals noted in its opinion, with UIM coverage, "[t]he insurer 
stands in the shoes of the [under]insured motorist and must pay if the motorist would be 
2
 For example, suppose a plaintiff sustains $40,000 of damages in an automobile accident, 
under circumstances where the tortfeasor who caused the accident only has $25,000 in 
liability coverage. Under these circumstances, the injured person could seek an additional ^ 
$15,000 from her own UIM insurer. 
6 
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required to pay." Opinion |^ 7. Ironically, though, the Court of Appeals' ruling places a 
person in a better position if she is injured by an underinsured motorist than if the 
tortfeasor were fully insured. {See p. 11, infra) 
II. UTAH'S SURVIVAL STATUTE 
At common law, actions for personal injuries abated upon the death of either the 
wrongdoer or the injured party. Kynaston v. United States, 111 F.2d 506, 509 (10th Cir. 
1983) (analyzing history of Utah's survival statute). To mitigate this harsh effect, the 
Utah legislature adopted its first "survival statute" in 1953, preserving certain actions 
upon the wrongdoer's death, but not upon the injured person's death. Id. at 510. 
In 1967, the statute was amended to provide limited nonabatement upon the 
injured party's death. Significantly, however, the 1967 amendment expressly rejected 
survival of any "claims relating to pain and suffering." Id. (According to the 
amendment's sponsor, "pain and suffering is a personal thing that's suffered by the 
individual; it's not suffered by anyone else." Id. at 511 n.10 (quoting Utah S. Jour., 37th 
Sess. 197-98 (1967) remarks of Senator Welch)). 
The Survival Statute was amended again in 1977. With respect to an injured 
person who died prior to judgment or settlement, the statute provided that her personal 
representatives or heirs could "receive no more than the out-of-pocket expenses incurred 
by or on behalf of that injured person as the result of his injury . . . ." Id. Largely 
cosmetic amendments in 1991 brought the statute to the form in effect at the time of the 
events in this case: 
7 
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(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or death 
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate 
upon the death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured 
person or the personal representatives or heirs of the person who 
died have a cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
representative of the wrongdoer for special and general damages, 
subject to subsection (1 )(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies as a result 
of a cause other than the injury received as a result of the wrongful 
act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal representative or 
heirs of that person are entitled to receive no more than the out-of-
pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of that person as a result of 
his injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) (1996).3 
III. APPLICATION OF THE SURVIVAL STATUTE TO BERKEMEIR'S 
UIM CLAIM. 
It is uncontroverted in this case that if Berkemeir had died while pursuing a claim 
against Alexander, her Estate would have been limited to out-of-pocket expenses, which 
totaled less than the $50,000 she had already received. She could not recover any 
additional sum. It is also well established that, in order to seek underinsured motorist 
coverage, a claimant must possess a "viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment 
in a court of law." Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc., 2000 UT 90, ][ 4, 15 
J
 Subsection (b) was amended in 2001 to read: "If prior to judgment or settlement the 
injured person dies as a result of a cause other than the injury received as a result of the 
wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal representative or heirs of that 
person have a cause of action against the wrongdoer only for special damages occurring 
prior to death that result from the injury caused by the wrongdoer, including income loss. 
'Special damages' does not include pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and 
other not readily quantifiable damages frequently referred to as general damages" 
(New language italicized). Utah Code Ann. § 78-1 l-12(l)(b) (2001 supp.) 
8 
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P.3d 1030, 1034, quoting Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192, 195 
(Utah App. 1996). 
Putting these two principles together, it seems irrefutable that, because the Estate 
was precluded upon Berkemeir's death from recovering against Alexander under the 
Survival Statute, it likewise had no claim for UIM benefits. The Court of Appeals, 
however, reached a different conclusion. In holding that the Survival Statute did not 
affect Berkemeir's claim for UIM benefits, the court followed a three-step process: 
1) First, it held that Berkemeir was "legally entitled to recover" damages from 
the underinsured motorist because a "settlement" had occurred between Berkemeir and 
the Hartford with respect to the UIM benefits that was "able to be reduced to judgment in 
a court of law." Opinion f^ 10. (This contention had not been briefed or argued below by 
either party, or addressed by the district court.) 
2) The Court of Appeals next held that the Survival Statute's reference to 
claims "arising out of personal injury" is ambiguous, and construed that language as 
limited solely to "tort" claims. Opinion \ 12. 
3) Pursuant to those conclusions, the Court of Appeals held that because a 
claim for UIM benefits is not a tort claim, it does not "arise out of personal injury," and 
therefore the Survival Statute is irrelevant to Berkemeir's UIM claim. Opinion ^ 13-15. 
As discussed below, the Berkemeir opinion conflicts not only with this Court's 
precedent, but also that of another panel of the Court of Appeals. 
9 
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A. The Court of Appeals' determination that a "settlement" occurred is 
contrary to the ordinary meaning of the term, and without factual or legal basis. 
The Court of Appeals first addressed the issue of whether Berkemeir was "legally 
entitled to recover" damages from the tortfeasor, as required to claim UIM benefits. In 
answering that question, the court took a novel approach: Instead of examining the 
underlying law governing Berkemeir's claim against Alexander (which would include the 
Survival Statute), the court instead decided that, as a matter of law, three "concessions" 
by the Hartford created a "settlement" with Berkemeir that was "able to be reduced to 
judgment in a court of law." Opinion f 10. From that, the court concluded that the 
"legally entitled to recover" prerequisite to UIM benefits was satisfied. Id. 
This conclusion subjugates the plain meaning of "settlement" to an entirely new 
and, frankly, strange meaning. The ordinary meaning of "settlement" requires that parties 
have achieved a meeting of the minds as to the "essential terms" of the resolution of their 
claims against each other. See, e.g., Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Utah 1995). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals found a settlement based entirely upon three factors: 1) 
the Hartford agreed that the tortfeasor, Alexander, was negligent, and did not object when 
Berkemeir settled with Alexander's liability insurer for his policy limits; 2) the Hartford 
acknowledged that it owed something to Berkemeir in terms of UIM benefits, and 3) the 
Hartford consented to have an arbitrator decide just what that something was. Opinion ^ 
10. 
Where is the "settlement" here? Surely the essential terms of a settlement of a 
UIM claim must at least include the amount of money that the insurer is to pay. See, e.g., 
10 
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Sackler, 897 P.2d at 1221 (no settlement without meeting of minds as to payment terms). 
Obviously, Berkemeir could not have filed a motion to enforce this so-called 
"settlement," which is simply non-existent under Utah law. 
The sole authority cited by the Court of Appeals for its ruling was the principle 
that insurance policies should be "liberally construed in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance." Id. Ironically, 
though, the opinion instead defeats the purpose of UIM insurance, which is to place the 
injured party in the same position as if the tortfeasor had additional liability insurance. 
A simple hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume that Alexander has a liability 
policy through Allstate with $100,000 limits. Further, assume that Allstate does not 
dispute Alexander's negligence, but the parties cannot agree on the extent of Berkemeir's 
injuries, and therefore agree to arbitrate that issue. Berkemeir dies for reasons unrelated 
to the accident before the arbitration. Under these circumstances, it is uncontroverted that 
the Survival Statute would limit the Estate's recovery against Alexander to out-of-pocket 
expenses. Under the Court of Appeal's ruling, though, if Berkemeir were "lucky" enough 
to have been struck by a tortfeasor with insufficient liability insurance limits, her estate 
could continue to seek $100,000. 
This aspect of the ruling not only lacks legal support, but is contrary to public 
policy. Under the Court of Appeals' reasoning, any party who acknowledges some 
4
 Perhaps Berkemeir might have sought to compel the arbitration, although the Policy 
allows either party to withhold consent. In any event, though, there is nothing to arbitrate 
if the Estate has no viable claim under the Survival Statute. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
degree of fault or responsibility has "settled" a claim, and the survival statute no longer 
applies — even if damages are hotly contested. Thus, the fairly common (and socially 
desirable) practice of admitting negligence early on in some automobile accident claims 
will now be discouraged, to avoid waiving any later reliance on the provisions of the 
Survival Statute. Defendants also now have an incentive to refuse arbitration, lest that 
too deprive them of Survival Statute protections. These undesirable, yet inevitable, 
results of the Court of Appeals opinion further show the need for reversal by this Court. 
B. The Court of Appeals erred by holding that a UIM claim for benefits does 
not "arise out of personal injury/' and therefore survives the claimant's death. 
Regardless of the resolution of Point A, the Court of Appeals committed a 
fundamental error by deeming the key language of the Survival Statute ambiguous, and 
concluding that a contract claim for UIM benefits does not "arise out o f personal injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-1 l-12(l)(a). 
"When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language and go no further 
unless we find the language ambiguous." Cook v. Zions First National Bank, 2002 UT 
105 ]f 8, 57 P.3d 1084. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Estate offered a 
"plausible" reading of the Survival Statute's wording, and therefore the statute was 
ambiguous. Opinion ]f 12. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals omitted any discussion of 
the ordinary and plain meaning of the phrase "arising out of." Instead, it simply adopted 
the Estate's argument "focusing more on the general fact that tort actions 'arise out of 
personal injury,' and asserting, therefore, that the Survival Statute applies only to actions 
in tort." Id. 
12 
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In other words, the Court of Appeals ruling was based upon its assumption that, 
because all tort claims arise out of personal injury, then all claims that arise out of 
personal injury must be torts. (This brings to mind the old school lesson that just because 
all dogs are mammals does not mean that all mammals are dogs.) The legislature is 
presumed to use all words advisedly. If the legislature had intended to use the word 
"torts," it would have been easy enough for it to do so, particularly as the statute has been 
amended four times. It chose instead to address all claims "arising out o f personal 
injury, a more expansive category. 
There is a long line of cases in Utah finding the plain meaning of the term "arising 
out o f to be unambiguous — and quite broad in its scope. See, e.g., Meadow Valley 
Contractors, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 190, ^  14, 27 P.2d 594, 597. 
("[T]he term 'arising out of is ordinarily understood to mean originating from, incident 
to, or in connection with the item in question.") (quoting National Farmers Union Prop. 
& Cos. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978)); Cook, supra. 
The phrase "has much broader significance than 'caused by,'" requiring only some 
type of "nexus" between the event and the damage. Meadow Valley Contractors, 2001 
UT App 190, at T| 14. In the UIM context, there is far more than a mere "nexus" between 
UIM benefits and the claimant's personal injury. Berkemeir's UIM claim would not even 
exist but for the underlying automobile accident and her personal injury claim against 
Alexander. The UIM claim is measured by the extent of Berkemeir's personal injury, and 
is subject to same elements, defenses, and all other aspects of personal injury law. Indeed, 
the Hartford "stands in the shoes" of the tortfeasor. Opinion ^ 7. 
13 
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Consistent with that principle, this Court has held that where Utah's wrongful 
death statute barred an action for the death of an unborn child, it identically barred a 
claim for UIM benefits. In State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (1996), the 
insureds' pregnant daughter died in a car accident. The insureds received the 
underinsured tortfeasor's policy limits "for both deaths," and then sought UIM benefits 
under their own State Farm policy, which, like the Hartford's Policy, covered damages 
that an insured was "legally entitled to recover" from the tortfeasor. State Farm asserted 
that the insureds were not legally entitled to maintain an action for wrongful death of the 
unborn child, and therefore had no entitlement to UIM benefits. This Court affirmed 
summary judgment for State Farm, denying UIM benefits because the plain language of 
the wrongful death statute precluded a viable action. Id. at 1187. 
Later that year, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for a UIM 
insurer in Peterson, supra, on the grounds that the Workers' Compensation Act would 
have barred an action brought by the insured. Because the Act prevented the plaintiff 
from establishing a "legal determination of the [underinsured's] liability" and "the extent 
of damages sustained," the court observed, the insurer's obligation to provide UIM 
coverage was not implicated. 927 P.2d at 196-97. 
Adopting Peterson's reasoning, this Court held in Lieber, supra, that where the 
Workers' Compensation Act did not bar an action against third parties, the plaintiff 
likewise was not barred from claiming uninsured (UM) benefits. There, the plaintiff-
employee was injured in a multi-car accident while driving on the job and brought suit 
against two drivers who allegedly caused the accident but fled the scene. The plaintiff 
14 
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also named his employer's UM insurer in a representative capacity for the two drivers and 
for any "underinsured drivers involved in the accident." 2000 UT 90, <|[ 5. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in part on the grounds that the Act 
precluded the employee from collecting from his employer, and thus from his employer's 
UM carrier. This Court reversed, recognizing that workers' compensation immunity 
barred a viable claim against the plaintiffs co-worker (and thus any UM claim as well), 
but noting that the Act did not preclude an action against third parties. Accordingly, the 
insurer's obligation to provide UM coverage was implicated with respect to the latter. 
In every sense of the phrase, UIM claims "arise out o f personal injury. The 
legislature has characterized underinsured motorist benefits as providing coverage for 
"damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily 
injury, sickness, disease, or death." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9) (emphasis added). 
The Policy similarly states that Hartford will provide "compensatory damages" 
recoverable from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of 
bodily injury', (1) sustained by an insured; and (2) caused by an accident. (R. 3, 21, 36, 
91, 191) (emphases added). 
This same result was reached in the only case cited in the Court of Appeal's 
Opinion regarding application of a survival statute to UIM benefits — which, 
interestingly, happened to reach the opposite conclusion than the Court of Appeals. See 
Opinion j^ 15 ("[B]ecause the Estate's claim sounds in contract, not tort, it is unaffected 
by the Survival Statute. But see Beaudry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 
11, 13-14 (Minn. 1994) (concluding, under nearly identical circumstances, that the cause 
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of action was limited by Minnesota's Survival Statute)").5 (A copy of Beaudry is 
included in the appendix.) 
Because Beaudry is the only known case tc address this specific issue, and because 
Minnesota's survival statute is quite similar to Utah's,6 it is helpful to examine in some 
detail that decision, which truly does involve strikingly similar facts. Like Berkemeir, 
Beaudry was the passenger in her own vehicle driven by one of her children, and was 
injured in a car accident. Beaudry's vehicle had UIM coverage of $100,000 per person. 
She settled with the underlying liability carrier for its limits without objection from her 
UIM carrier, then died of unrelated causes before reaching an agreement as to the amount 
of UIM benefits to which she was entitled. 
As in this case, Beaudry's estate argued that her claim for UIM benefits "survived" 
her death. The Minnesota Supreme Court wrote: 
The issue before us may be framed as follows: 
When an underinsured motorist claimant dies of causes unrelated to the 
auto accident, does her underinsured motorist claim survive the abatement of the 
underlying tort claim against the tortfeasor? The answer to this question depends 
on whether the underinsured motorist claim is viewed as a cause of action arising 
out of an injury to the person, which does not survive the death of the person, or as 
a contract action, which does survive the person's death. 
5
 Although not mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion, the Hartford notes that 
Beaudry was later overruled on other (statute of limitations) grounds. Oanes v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 2000). 
6
 Minnesota's statute reads: "A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person dies 
with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, except as provided in Section 573.02 
[allowing recovery of special damages]." Beaudry, 518 N.W.2d at 12. 
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518N.W.2datl2. 
The court began its analysis by noting that, if Beaudry had died before settling 
with the tortfeasor, even if a lawsuit were already pending, her claim against him would 
have abated. "Beaudry's estate seeks to circumvent the survival statute by characterizing 
her UIM lawsuit as a contract action for underinsured motorist benefits," it stated. "As a 
contract action, her estate would be able to recover underinsured motorist benefits 
measured by the general damages that would have been recoverable against the 
tortfeasor." Id. at 13. 
The court recognized that a claim for UIM benefits is a first-party coverage claim 
based on contract, as in Utah. Nevertheless, the court wrote, "liability for UM and UIM 
benefits is determined by tort law, i.e., by what the tortfeasor would have had to pay the 
claimant if the tortfeasor had not been uninsured or underinsured." Id. In that sense, the 
court observed, a UIM policy "has generally been understood as excess coverage, to be 
utilized only after the cause of action against the insured tortfeasor has been concluded." 
Id. (citation omitted). 
The test for survivability lies in the substance, not the form, of the cause of action, 
the court stated. Id. Thus, it was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that "they are 
not seeking recovery for pain and suffering but rather enforcement of their contractual 
rights," and that all conditions precedent to a UIM claim had been met before Beaudry 
died. "At the time of her death, the liability under that coverage still remained to be 
determined, and her UIM claim was still unresolved and pending," the court wrote. Id. at 
14. 
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The Beaudry court pointed to the language of the UIM policy, which, like the 
Hartford's policy, obligated the insurer to "pay damages for bodily injury an insured is 
legally entitled to collect" from the underinsured driver. Id. "Put another way," the court 
wrote, "the UIM claimant can collect from State Farm what the claimant could have 
collected in damages for bodily from the tortfeasor if the tortfeasor had not been 
underinsured. And that determination is directly dependent on the law governing 'a cause 
of action arising out of an injury to the person.'" The court concluded that "the primary 
cause of the damages sought to be recovered as UIM benefits is the injury Alice Beaudry 
suffered in the auto accident." Id. Consequently, an argument that the plaintiffs were not 
seeking damages for pain and suffering "elevates form over substance," id., the court 
held, and Beaudry's UIM claim did not survive her death. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning is sound, and is consistent with Utah 
precedent. Peterson and Lieber each recognized that, although UIM or UM claims are 
contractual in nature, a viable tort claim against the tortfeasor must exist to trigger the 
insurer's duty to provide those benefits. Peterson, 927 P.2d at 194 n. 1, 195; Lieber, 2000 
UT 90 fflf 4, 11- The two claims are inextricable, and the Court of Appeals' opinion that 
UIM claims do not arise out of personal injury should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the appellant respectfully requests the Court to 
reverse the Court of Appeals, and to remand to the district court with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of the Hartford. 
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THORNE, Judge: 
fl Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest (Hartford) appeals 
the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of 
the Estate of Dorothy Berkemeir (the Estate) and the denial of 
Hartford's motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 On October 16, 1995, James Alexander inexplicably turned his 
vehicle into oncoming traffic on Interstate 80 causing a 
collision with Dorothy Berkemeir's car.1 Berkemeir was injured, 
and the medical costs associated with treating her injuries 
1. Berkemeir was a passenger in the vehicle at the time. 
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exceeded $38,000.2 Alexander conceded liability. Subsequently, 
on October 9, 1996, Berkemeir, without objection from Hartford, 
her insurer, executed a settlement agreement and release with 
Alexander and his insurance company for the $50,000 limit of his 
automobile liability policy. Berkemeir then filed a claim with 
Hartford demanding additional coverage under her underinsured 
motorist policy (UIM).3 
13 Hartford conceded that Berkemeir's damages exceeded 
Alexander's liability coverage; however, Hartford disputed the 
amount Berkemeir was entitled to under her contract. Thus, the 
parties entered into arbitration to determine the deficiency in 
coverage that occurred as a result of Alexander's underinsured 
status. The parties agreed to a hearing date of July 21, 1997. 
However, because Hartford desired an independent medical 
examination, the hearing was later rescheduled. Unfortunately, 
before the arbitration hearing was held, Berkemeir died of causes 
unrelated to the accident. Following her death, the Estate 
reduced its demand from $100,000 to $45,580.40, but based on its 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) (1996) (the 
Survival Statute) Hartford denied the Estate's claim and withdrew 
from the arbitration. The Estate then filed a complaint in the 
district court claiming breach of contract, preemptively arguing 
that the Survival Statute was inapplicable. After Hartford filed 
an answer, the parties submitted cross-motions for summary 
judgment preceded by a joint factual stipulation and summary of 
the parties' legal positions, including argument concerning the 
applicability.of the Survival Statute. Following oral argument, 
the trial court granted the Estate's motion for partial summary 
judgment concluding that the action arose out of contract and 
that the Survival Statute was inapplicable. Hartford petitioned 
for interlocutory review. The Utah Supreme Court granted the 
request and transferred the matter to this court. We affirm. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
K4 Hartford argues that following Berkemeir's death the 
Estate's claim was limited by the Survival Statute, thus, the 
trial court erred in granting the Estate partial summary 
judgment. "Because summary judgment is not granted as a matter 
of fact, but rather as a matter of law, we review the trial 
court's legal conclusions for correctness." Pixton v. State Farm 
2. In compliance with Berkemeir's insurance policy, Hartford 
paid her the limits on both her extended coverage provision and 
personal injury protection clauses, a total of $10,000. 
3. Berkemeir demanded the limit of her UIM policy, $100,000. 
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Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 809 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Moreover, "' [i]n matters of pure statutory interpretation, [we] 
review[] a trial court's ruling for correctness and give[] no 
deference to its legal conclusions. '" Lieber v. ITT Hartford 
Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2000 UT 90,1(7, 15 P.3d 1030 (quoting Stephens v. 
Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997)). 
ANALYSIS 
15 Hartford asserts that Berkemeir's death from causes 
unrelated to the underlying accident relieves Hartford from the 
duty to pay the Estate any additional UIM benefits.4 Hartford 
predicates this argument on its reading of Berkemeir's UIM policy 
language and the effect that the Survival Statute has on 
Hartford's duty under the policy. Accordingly, to determine if 
the trial court erred, we must determine both Hartford's duty 
under the contract and what effect the Survival Statute has on 
that duty under these circumstances. 
%6 We turn first to the language of Berkemeir's UIM policy. We 
construe insurance policy language "liberally in favor of the 
insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat 
the purposes of insurance." U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 
P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993) (quotations and citations omitted). 
Moreover, "provisions that limit or exclude coverage should be 
strictly construed against the insurer" and "must be interpreted 
and construed as an ordinary purchaser of insurance would 
understand it." Id. at 523. Berkemeir's UIM policy promised 
that Hartford would pay Berkemeir 
compensatory damages which an insured is 
legally entitled to recover from the owner or 
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle 
because of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by an insured; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
The owner's or operator's liability for these 
damages must arise out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of the underinsured motor 
vehicle. 
4. This argument is based on the assumption that the prior 
amounts paid to Berkemeir satisfied her out-of-pocket expenses, 
which is all that is required under the Survival Statute. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) (1996). Because we conclude that 
the Survival Statute has no impact on the present case, we do not 
address in this context the meaning or impact of the phrase "out-
of-pocket expenses." 
20010437-CA 3 
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We will pay damages under this coverage 
caused by an underinsured motor vehicle only 
if 1 or 2 below applies: 
1. The limits of liability under any 
applicable bodily injury liability bonds 
or policies have been exhausted by 
payment of judgments or settlements; or 
2. A tentative settlement has been made 
between an insured and the insurer of 
the underinsured motor vehicle and we: 
a. have been given prompt written 
notice of such tentative 
settlement; and 
b advance payment to the insured 
in an amount equal to the 
tentative settlement within 30 
days after receipt of 
notification. 
(Emphasis added.) 
f7 We have previously determined that "for an insured to 
satisfy the 'legally entitled to recover' criterion, Utah law 
requires a viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment in 
a court of law." Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 
192, 195 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added). This "typically 
entails a lawsuit against the [under-]insured tortfeasor to 
litigate the issues of liability and damages. A judgment 
favorable to the insured fixes the insurer's contractual duty to 
satisfy that judgment, within policy limits." Lima v. Chambers, 
657 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1982). Thus, the simplest way "for an 
insured to satisfy the 'legally entitled to recover' criterion" 
is in the form of "'a legal determination of the liability of the 
[under-]insured motorist and the extent of the damages 
sustained.'" Peterson, 927 P.2d at 195-96 (interpreting Lyon v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739, 745 
(1971)) . However, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, in the 
context of uninsured motorist insurance; 
"The aim of the uninsured motorist statute is 
to minimize the catastrophic financial loss 
for victims of automobile accidents caused by 
the negligence of uninsured tortfeasors. We 
believe it is wholly inconsistent with this 
broad remedial purpose to permit the insurer 
to evade mandated coverage by erecting an 
artificial, arbitrary barrier to recovery." 
Marakis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 765 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 
1988) (quoting Surrey v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 424 N.E.2d 
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234, 238 (Mass. 1981)). Moreover, "'the purpose of mandatory 
uninsured-motorist insurance is "protection equal to that which 
would be afforded if the offending motorist carried liability 
insurance. . . . [T]he insurer stands in the shoes of the 
uninsured motorist [UM] and must pay if [the motorist] would be 
required to pay.,l,M Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P. 2d 255, 260 
(Utah 1997) (quoting Fetch v. Ouam, 530 N.W.2d 337, 339 (N.D. 
1995)). While the court clearly made this statement in reference 
to uninsured motorist coverage, we see no reason that this logic 
should not apply equally to statutorily mandated UIM coverage. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (2001); Lieber v. ITT Hartford 
Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2000 UT 90,1(8, 15 P.3d 1030 (accepting our 
application of UM case law to cases involving UIM claims). 
H8 The supreme court has also determined that once an insured 
claims under their UIM coverage, the relationship between the 
parties changes from a third-party relationship, to a first-party 
adversarial relationship. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 
P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985). As a result, the supreme court 
concluded that "the duties and obligations of the parties are 
contractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, a breach of 
those implied or express duties can give rise only to a cause of 
action in contract, not one in tort." Id. at 800 (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
1|9 Hartford, after acknowledging the existence of the preceding 
authority, argues that this case is instead controlled by 
Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996), and that absent a legal determination of Berkemeir's 
damages, they were under no contractual duty concerning 
Berkemeir's claim either before or after her death. In Peterson, 
we concluded that "'a legal determination of the liability of the 
[under-]insured motorist and the extent of the damages 
sustained,'" id. at 196 (citation omitted), are predicate 
elements necessary to trigger an insurer's contractual duty. 
However, in Lieber the Utah Supreme Court adopted a different 
interpretation of the phrase "legally entitled to recover," and 
concluded that a claimant is legally entitled to recover if they 
"have 'a viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment.'" 
Lieber, 2000 UT 90 at 1[8 (emphasis added) (quoting Peterson, 927 
P.2d at 195). In so concluding, the supreme court, by inference, 
chose not to adopt the more rigorous standard we set forth in 
Peterson. Accordingly, to qualify under the "legally entitled to 
recover" language of a UIM contract, a party is not required to 
establish that a legal determination has been made. Rather, 
absent specific language to the contrary contained within the 
contract, a party is "legally entitled to recover" if they can 
show the existence of a "'viable claim that is able to be reduced 
to judgment.'" Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We see 
no reason that this showing cannot be made with either a judgment 
20010437-CA 5 
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entered by a trial court, or a formal, or informal, settlement 
agreement between the parties. 
HlO Here, Hartford accepted from the outset the fact that 
Alexander caused the accident that resulted in Berkemeir's 
injuries. Hartford, without objection, allowed Berkemeir to 
enter into a settlement and release with Alexander and his 
insurance company for the limits of his policy. Then, when 
Berkemeir approached Hartford and submitted a demand under the 
terms of her UIM policy, Hartford conceded that her injuries 
exceeded the limits of Alexander's policy. To determine the 
amount due, the parties, under the terms of Berkemeir's policy, 
entered into arbitration. We conclude that Hartford's 
concessions concerning Alexander's liability and its concession 
that Berkemeir's damages exceeded Alexander's policy limits, as 
well as its reliance on language from Berkemeir's insurance 
contract relating to arbitration, qualify as a settlement "that 
is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law." Id. at 
195. Thus, by its own actions, Hartford acknowledged its duty 
under the contract concerning Berkemeir's UIM claim. See U.S. 
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993) (setting 
forth our rule requiring this court to construe insurance policy 
language "liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of 
insurance" (quotations and citations omitted)). 
Ill Our conclusion does not, however, necessarily resolve the 
question of whether the Estate's claim is limited by the Survival 
Statute. To make that determination, we must examine the 
Survival Statute to determine its effect on this claim. When we 
are "called upon to interpret a statute, 'our primary goal is to 
give effect to the legislature's- intent in light of the purpose 
the statute was meant to achieve.'" Lieber, 2000 UT 90 at 1|7 
(quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998)). The 
Survival Statute in force at the time of Berkemeir's death 
provides; 
(a) Causes of action arising out of personal 
injury to the person or death caused by 
the wrongful act or negligence of 
another do not abate upon the death of 
the wrongdoer or the injured person. 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the 
injured person dies as a result of a 
cause other than the injury received as 
a result of the wrongful act or 
negligence of the wrongdoer, the 
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personal representative or heirs of that 
person are entitled to receive no more 
than the out-of-pocket expenses incurred 
by or on behalf of that injured person 
as a result of his injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 (1996). Hartford's argument relies on 
the phrase "arising out of personal injury" and focuses on the 
intended scope of this language. Thus, we examine the statute to 
determine the intended scope of its coverage. 
ijl2 Hartford's interpretation of the phrase "arising out of 
personal injury" suggests that the statute is meant to limit any 
claim involving a personal injury when the person injured dies 
before the action is fully adjudicated. The Estate, on the other 
hand, urges a different interpretation focusing more on the 
general fact that tort actions "arise out of personal injury" and 
asserting, therefore, that the Survival Statute applies only to 
actions in tort. Because we conclude that both interpretations 
are reasonable, see Derbidae v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 
P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("'Ambiguous' means capable of 
'"two or more plausible meanings."'" (citations omitted)), we 
look beyond the statute's plain language to determine the 
legislative intent. See id. ("When statutory ambiguity exists, 
we must determine the 'legislature's intent in light of the 
entire statute's purpose.' . . . Our analysis is further guided 
by the Legislature's blanket directive that statutes 'be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice.'" (citations omitted)). 
1l3 In Kvnaston v. United States, 717 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1983), 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed Utah's Survival 
Statute and described its genesis in relatively specific terms. 
The court explained; 
At common law, actions for personal injury 
torts . . . do not survive the death of the 
wrongdoer. To remedy this defect, Utah 
enacted its first survival statute in 1953. 
The purpose of the statute was not to create 
a new cause of action as the wrongful death 
statute did, but rather to abrogate the 
common law rule of abatement and continue or 
perpetuate ("survive") a cause of action in 
existence before the wrongdoer's [or 
victim's] death. 
Id. at 509. The court further stated, "[s]urvival statutes 
provide for the continuance of an injured person's cause of 
action in order to preserve any interests which have accrued in 
20010437-CA 7 
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the recovery of damages to his estate should he die prior to the 
resolution of the suit." Id. at 511. We agree with the Tenth 
Circuit's reading, and after reviewing the history of Survival 
Statutes in general, we agree with the position urged by the 
Estate. Our conclusion is supported by the general history 
surrounding survival statutes, which clearly indicates that 
ff[b]oth at common law and under statute, it is a general rule 
that a cause of action founded on a contract survives the death 
of either party and a pending contract action does not abate on 
the death of a party." 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 147(a) 
(1994) (footnotes omitted). Moreover, our conclusion is further 
supported by the fact that at common law, actions that are only 
"nominally laid in tort," but actually lay in contract, generally 
are not subject to abatement. Id. § 147(b) (footnote omitted). 
1|l4 We conclude that the Survival Statute was adopted to 
abrogate the common law rule of abatement in tort actions that 
was applied following the death of either the tortfeasor or the 
injured party. See id. § 13 0. Because we can discern no other 
reason for the legislature's adoption of the Survival Statute 
beyond its desire to mitigate the common law rule of abatement, 
we conclude that the elimination of the abatement of tort actions 
was the intended target of the Survival Statute. 
1fl5 Here, while there is no dispute that the origins of 
Berkemeir's claim against Alexander "arose out of personal 
injury," the subject of the present dispute does not actually 
arise from her physical injuries. Rather, the present dispute 
arose only after Hartford's duty under the contract was triggered 
and Hartford then allegedly failed to meet its obligation. Thus, 
the Estate's claim arose solely from Hartford's alleged breach of 
the contract and not from Berkemeir's personal injury. 
Therefore, because the Estate's claim sounds in contract, not 
tort, it is unaffected by the Survival Statute. But see Beudry 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 11, 13-14 (Minn. 
1994) (concluding, under nearly identical circumstances, that the 
cause of action was limited by Minnesota's Survival Statute). 
fl6 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying 
Hartford's motion for summary judgment and granting the Estate 
partial summary judgment. Thus, we remand this case to the trial 
court to determine the extent of the contractual damages. 
CONCLUSION 
fl7 Hartford's concessions concerning liability and the extent, 
if not the specific amount, of damages resulting from Berkemeir's 
accident triggered its duties under the contract. Moreover, the 
Survival Statute is intended to abrogate the common law rule of 
20010437-CA 8 
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abatement in tort actions and has no affect on contract claims, 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to grant the 
Estate partial summary judgment. 
/U&-sf.-7 
William A. Thome Jr./Judge 
118 WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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feasor after the underlying tori feasor has paid the policy 
limits—I mean, the smart thing tc do, had this been known— 
had people understood that she was going to die and this 
thing wouldn't get resolved before she died would have beer. 
to litigate the underlying claim. But apparently no one 
thought we ought tc do that and it get settled and then thev 
made the claim. 
And I don't think it's appropriate for the courts 
to start telling people that, Well, you have to litigate 
claims where its just an exercise in futility so that you car 
assert a first-party claim against the insurance coverage for 
underinsured motorist coverage. I think Hartford has an 
obligation to pay and 1 don't think the death of their 
insured, as it relates to the first-party claim, has anythinc 
to co with this statute. 
And for those reasons, I'm going to grant the 
partial summary judgment that is sought by the plaintiff and 
deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment. I think 
there's still an issue as to what the total claims are ard 
Hartford is entitled to certainly defend against that. 
But I'm not—I'm going to look at this claim arc if 
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here—the order will say it's denied because the staf-e 
doesn't apply for these reasons, boorr., boom, boon. And those 
are the reasons that we enumerated in our memorandum. 
THE COURT: And that would be aoo'-OD-i ~e - r.-ee-
MR. LARSON: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: Yeah. And that would be appropriate. 
MR. LARSON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: I don't suggest to mean that because I 
didn't happen to touch on the word here that it shouldn't be 
induced when 1 make these brief oral rulings. Thank you, 
counsel. We'll be in recess. 
(Partial transcript concluded at this ocint.^ 
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M A R K A. L A R S E N (3727) 
LISA C . R I C O (8901) 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF DOROTHY 
BERKEMEIR, by and through its 
Executor, KAREN NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF THE MIDWEST, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING THE ESTATE'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
HARTFORD'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990911059 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
On January 29,2001, at 10:00 a.m., Defendant Hartford Insurance Company of the 
Midwest's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Estate's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment came on for hearing before the above-captioned Court, the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, presiding. Mark A . Larsen and Lisa C. Rico appeared and represented 
Plaintiff. Mark L. Anderson appeared and represented Defendant. Based upon the oral 
argument of counsel, the Stipulation to Facts and Legal Positions ("the Stipulation"), which 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was filed with the Court on August 11, 2000, and the Motions and Memoranda filed by the 
parties, it is ORDERED as follows: 
1. Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. The Estate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted. 
3. On October 16,1995, Berkemeir sustained personal injuries in an automobile 
accident. On October 9,1996, Berkemeir settled her personal injury claim against James 
Alexander ("Alexander"), the driver of the other vehicle involved in the collision, for the 
$50,000 limit of his liability insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). 
Hartford did not object to Berkemeir's settlement of all claims against Alexander for the 
$50,000 limit of his policy with Allstate. The proceeds of the settlement agreement, 
however, coupled with the $10,000 in personal injury and medical benefits Hartford paid 
to Berkemeir under her insurance policy, did not fully compensate her for the damages she 
sustained as a result of the collision. 
4. As a result, Berkemeir demanded that Hartford pay the $100,000 in 
underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration proceeding under the policy originally was 
scheduled for July 21, 1997. It was continued until September 23, 1997, to allow for 
Berkemeir's Independent Medical Examination. Berkemeir died in the interim on August 
15, 1997, of causes unrelated to the injuries she sustained in the October 16, 1995, 
collision. Prior to Berkemeir's death, initially Hartford refused to pay her claim for 
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underinsured motorist benefits. Hartford later refused the claim, asserting that Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-11-12(1)(b) precludes the Estate from collecting under the insurance contract. 
5. In support of its refusal to pay the Estate underinsured motorist benefits, 
Hartford relies upon the personal injury tort provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 to 
interpret the underinsured motorist provision of the insurance policy, the latter of which 
provides in pertinent part: 
A. We will pay compensatory damages which an insured 
is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator 
of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by an insured; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 
uninsured motor vehicle. Any judgment for damages arising 
out of a suit brought without our written consent is not binding 
on us. 
6. The parties stipulated to the material facts of this case, leaving only questions 
of law for resolution. 
7. Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12 does not apply to the facts of this case because 
the Estate's claim is based in contract law rather than personal injury tort law. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, held: "[l]n a first-party1 
1
 The Court used the term "first-party" to refer to an insurance contract under which 
the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses the insured has 
sustained. 
3 
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relationship between an insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties 
are contractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, a breach of those implied or express 
duties can give rise only to a cause of action in contract, not tort." Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795,800 (Utah 1985)(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court held such 
causes of action are based in contract and not tort law. 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) specifically applies to M[c]auses of action 
arising out of personal injury to the person or death caused by the wrongful act or 
negligence of another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or injured person," 
(emphasis added). Berkemeir's personal injury claim against Alexander was settled for the 
limits of his insurance policy with Allstate. What remains is the Estate's claim against 
Hartford based on the insurance contract between Berkemeir and Hartford. Hartford's 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1)(b), reads into the statute meaning beyond 
its plain words. T h e best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the legislature is the 
plain language of the statute." Lieberv. ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc., 2000 UT 72, 
78; 403 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5. The Estate's cause of action does not arise out of the 
personal injury Berkemeir suffered as a result of Alexander's negligence. The Estate's 
cause of action arises from Hartford's refusal to pay Berkemeir's claim for underinsured 
motorist benefits, in whole or in part, in breach of the terms set forth on the face of the 
insurance contract. 
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9. Unlike the courts that have adopted the tort approach as a means of 
providing an insured with an adequate remedy for an insurer's recalcitrance, Hartford 
seeks to eliminate any further liability to the Estate by applying the tort provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-11-12 to the insurance contract. Hartford seeks this result despite 
stipulating that Berkemeir was riot fully compensated for the damages she incurred as a 
result of the accident. To apply Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 to the Estate's breach of 
contract claim is not only contrary to the policy concerns of encouraging an insurance 
carrier to delay the proper resolution of the claims of the elderly, but also is a distortion of 
contract law and statutory interpretation. 
10. Further, if Hartford wanted underinsured motorist benefits to expire if the 
death of the insured occurred before the arbitration was conducted and an award entered, 
it could easily have directly said so in the insurance contract. In Sandt, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: "Insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer and in 
favor of the insured because they are adhesion contracts drafted by insurance companies." 
854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993). The Court also explained that "insurance policies should 
be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and 
not defeat the purposes of insurance. Id. at 521-22 (citations omitted). 
11 Moreover, Berkemeir's cause of action against Hartford accrued, and the 
statute of limitations on her claim against Hartford began running, on either the date of her 
settlement with Alexander or upon Hartford's refusal to pay underinsured motorist benefits 
5 
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to Berkemeir in breach of the insurance contract. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 sets forth 
the statute of limitations for bringing a claim on an insurance policy, stating: "An action on 
a written policy or contract of first part insurance must be commenced within three years 
after the inception of the loss." The damages would be measured as of the date of the 
breach of the contract, when the cause of action accrued, and would not change based 
upon subsequent events. 
12. In Lang v. Aetna Life Insurance, the court discussed the "inception of loss" 
language of § 31A-21-313, stating: "The statute of limitations was triggered not by the 
personal injury giving rise to the suit but rather by the insurer's alleged breach [of contract] 
in refusing to defend against the suit." 196 F.3d 1102, at 1105 (10th Cir. 1999)(emphasis 
added). Similarly, the inception of Berkemeir's loss and the breach of contract claim was 
not triggered by the personal injury Berkemeir suffered but rather by Hartford's breach of 
contract in refusing to pay the underinsured motorist benefits. If Hartford's argument in this 
case were accepted, the statute of limitations would not be triggered until Alexander's 
liability was reduced to a judgment. This would require or at least encourage unnecessary, 
pointless litigation if the claim against the tortfeasor had to be reduced to judgment before 
an insured could maintain a claim against the underinsured motorist carrier. 
13. No one ever questioned Alexander's obvious liability, to which the parties in 
this case stipulated. The damages for that breach of contract are measured on the date 
of the breach, which is when the cause of action accrues, not at some later date after 
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Berkemeir's death. In Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, the Utah Supreme Court held a 
claim accrues on the occurrence of the last event necessary to complete the cause of 
action. 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). 
14. Prior to her settlement with Alexander and Hartford's refusal to pay 
underinsured motorist benefits, Berkemeir did not have a claim against Hartford. When 
Hartford breached the insurance contract, however, the last event necessary to create 
Berkemeir's cause of action against Hartford occurred. Hartford's breach of the insurance 
contract did not create a "cause[ ] of action arising out of personal injury to the person or 
death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another." Rather, the Alexander 
settlement combined with Hartford's refusal created a cause of action for breach of the 
insurance contract. 
15. The only remaining issue for trial in this case is the amount of the Estate's 
damages. 
Dated: March ^ , 2001. 
tonorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on March 23,2001, a copy of the foregoing Order Granting the 
Estate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was mailed to the following counsel of record: 
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518N.W.2dll 
(Citeas:518N.W.2dll) 
Supreme Court of Minnesota. 
William BEAUDRY, et al., Respondents, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, Appellant. 
No. C9-93-689. 
June 17, 1994. 
Insured's estate brought action against insurer for 
underinsured motorist benefits. The District Court, 
Chisago County, Linn Slattengren, J., entered 
summary judgment for insurer, and estate appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Lansing, J., 506 N.W.2d 
673, reversed. After granting petition for review, 
the Supreme Court, Simonett, J., held that 
underinsured motorist claim of estate did not 




[1] Abatement and Revival <®=>54 
2k54 
With "abatement," general damages, such as pain 
and suffering, die with person. M.S.A. § 573.01. 
[2] Abatement and Revival <®=>54 
2k54 
Even where injured person dies from cause related 
to injuries and personal injury action is converted 
into wrongful death action, general pain and 
suffering damages are not recoverable. 
[3] Abatement and Revival <s=>52 
2k52 
Test for survivability of claim upon death of 
claimant is in substance, not form, of cause of 
action. M.S.A. § 573.01. 
[4] Abatement and Revival <s=>53 
2k53 
Insured's claim for underinsured motorist benefits 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim 
Page 6 
abated, under survival statute, at her death, where 
primary cause of damages sought to be recovered as 
underinsured motorist benefits was injury insured 
suffered in automobile accident. M.S.A. §573.01. 
*U Syllabus by the Court 
The underinsured motorist claim of the estate of an 
injured person, who dies of causes unrelated to the 
auto accident, does not survive the abatement of the 
underlying personal injury action. 
William M. Hart, Joseph W.E. Schmitt, Meagher 
& Geer, and Albert J. Dickinson, Stringer & 
Rohleder, St. Paul, for appellant. 
James F. Dunn, Dunn & Elliott, St. Paul, for 
respondents. 




A cause of action for injury to the person dies with 
that person (except for special damages). But does 
the deceased person's claim for underinsured 
motorist benefits survive the abatement of the 
underlying tort claim? We answer the question 
"no" and reverse the contrary ruling of the court of 
appeals. 
On July 29, 1990, Alice Beaudry, age 75, was 
severely injured when the car in which she was a 
passenger and which was driven by her husband 
collided with a car driven by Leonard Defoe. The 
accident was Defoe's fault. 
Alice Beaudry's injuries required extensive medical 
care, her medical expenses eventually totaling 
$67,785.83. In October 1990, State Farm paid 
Alice Beaudry $20,000, the limits of its no-fault 
medical expense coverage. Initially, it appeared that 
the other driver, Defoe, was uninsured, and Mr. 
and Mrs. Beaudry were preparing for an uninsured 
motorist claim against their own insurer, State 
Farm. 
In May 1991, however, it was learned that Defoe 
had liability insurance with $30,000/60,000 limits. 
The Beaudrys negotiated a settlement with Defoe's 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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liability carrier, with the carrier to pay its $30,000 
limit on Alice Beaudry's claim (and $22,500 on 
William Beaudry's claim). State Farm was given 
notice of the proposed senlement pursuant to 
Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256 *12 
(Minn. 1983), but it elected not to substitute its own 
settlement draft. The Beaudrys then proceeded, in 
mid-November 1991, to conclude their settlement 
with Defoe on the terms proposed. 
At the same time, Beaudrys' counsel also formally 
advised State Farm it was making a claim for 
underinsured motorist benefits. The Beaudrys' 
State Farm policy provided underinsured motorist 
coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per 
occurrence. In early January 1992, more medical 
information having been supplied by the claimants, 
the Beaudrys twice made demands for the policy 
limits. 
On January 16, 1992, the Beaudrys first informed 
State Farm that Alice Beaudry was terminally ill 
with breast cancer and made another demand for the 
policy limits. On the same day, the Beaudrys 
commenced this lawsuit against State Farm for 
breach of contract for failure to pay underinsured 
motorist limits. Three days later, on January 19, 
Alice Beaudry died. The cancer which was the 
cause of her death was unrelated to the injuries 
received in the auto accident. 
The lawsuit alleged William and Alice Beaudry 
were each entitled to $100,000 in benefits. State 
Farm moved for summary judgment on the grounds 
that Alice Beaudry's claim for underinsured 
motorist benefits abated at her death under 
Minnesota's survival statute, Minn.Stat. f 573.01 
(1992). The trial court granted State Farm's 
motion. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that 
the underinsured motorist claim of Alice Beaudry 
was a contract action not subject to the survival 
statute. Beaudry v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 506 
N.W.2d 673, 675 (Minn.App. 1993). We granted 
State Farm's petition for further review. 
The issue before us may be framed as follows: 
When an underinsured motorist claimant dies of 
causes unrelated to the auto accident, does her 
underinsured motorist claim survive the abatement 
of the underlying tort claim against the tortfeasor? 
The answer to this question depends on whether the 
underinsured motorist claim is viewed as a cause of 
action arising out of an injury to the person, which 
does not survive the death of the person, or as a 
contract action, which does survive the person's 
death. 
Our survival statute, Minn.Stat. $ 573.01 (1992), 
reads: 
A cause of action arising out of an injury to the 
person dies with the person of the party in whose 
favor it exists, except as provided in section 
573.02. [FN1] All other causes of action by one 
against another, whether arising in contract or 
not, survive to the personal representative of the 
former and against those of the latter. 
FN1. Minn.Stat. § 573.02 provides two exceptions 
to the nonsurvivability of a deceased plaintiffs 
action arising out of an injury. Under subdivision 
1, the personal injury action is converted into a 
wrongful death action when die death is attributable 
to the injuries sustained. When death is unrelated 
to the injuries, then subdivision 2 provides for 
survivability of a claim for "special damages" as 
follows: 
When injury is caused to a person by the wrongful 
act or omission of any person or corporation and 
the person thereafter dies from a cause unrelated to 
those injuries, the trustee appointed in subdivision 
3 may maintain an action for special damages 
arising out of such injury if the decedent might 
have maintained an action therefor had the 
decedent lived. 
Minn.Stat. J 573.02, subd. 2. Special damages 
would include medical expenses, lost wages to date 
of death, and the like. 
[1][2] If Alice Beaudry had died before settling 
with the tortfeasor, even if she then had a lawsuit 
pending against the tortfeasor, her claim against the 
tortfeasor would have abated. With abatement, 
general damages, such as pain and suffering, die 
with the person. Indeed, even where the injured 
person dies from a cause related to the injuries and 
the personal injury action is converted into a 
wrongful death action, general pain and suffering 
damages are not recoverable. See, e.g., Fussner v. 
Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 351-52, 113 N.W.2d 355, 
358 (1961) (damages in a wrongful death action are 
for pecuniary loss). 
In this case Alice Beaudry's estate [FN2] seeks to 
circumvent the survival statute by characterizing 
*13 her UIM lawsuit as a contract action for 
underinsured motorist benefits. As a contract 
action, her estate would be able to recover 
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underinsured motorist benefits measured by the 
general damages that would have been recoverable 
against the tortfeasor. The Beaudrys concede that 
these general damages, such as pain and suffering, 
would be recoverable only up to the time of death, 
in this case for the period of approximately a year 
and a half that Alice Beaudry lived after the auto 
accident. 
FN2. The parties have agreed that if Alice 
Beaudry's UIM claim survives here, on return to 
the trial court a personal representative will be 
appointed for her estate to continue with the claim. 
See Witthuhn v. Durbahn, 279 Minn. 437, 439, 
157 N.W.2d 360, 361 (1968). For convenience of 
expression, we will continue in this opinion to refer 
to "the Beaudrys" rather than, with respect to Alice 
Beaudry, her estate. 
Recently, in Mcintosh v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 488 N.W.2d 476 
(Minn. 1992), and in Employers Mutual Cos. v. 
Nordstrom, 495 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1993), we 
discussed the nature of uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage. These are first party coverages, 
i.e., claims based on contract against one's own 
insurance company, unlike third party liability 
coverage where the insurer indemnifies the insured 
against claims of injured third parties. 
Nevertheless, as we pointed out in these two cases, 
liability for UM and UIM benefits is determined by 
tort law, i.e., by what the tortfeasor would have had 
to pay the claimant if the tortfeasor had not been 
uninsured or underinsured. 
Thus, in Mcintosh we cautioned, "In other words, 
under uninsured motorist coverage, the distinction 
between coverage and liability under that coverage 
is radically different than it is under first party 
coverage." Mcintosh, 488 N.W.2d at 479. In 
Nordstrom, we observed that "[a]n underinsured 
motorist claim is both alike and unlike a tort cause 
of action." Nordstrom, 495 N.W.2d at 856. We 
went on to say, "Underinsured coverage has 
generally been understood as excess coverage, to be 
utilized only after the cause of action against the 
insured tortfeasor has been concluded." Id. 
Whether an uninsured or underinsured motorist 
claim is to be viewed from its contract or tort 
aspects depends on the question being asked. 
Thus, for example, in O'Neill v. Illinois Farmers 
Insurance Co., 381 N.W.2d 439, 440 (Minn. 1986), 
we held that for the purpose of what statute of 
limitations applied to an underinsured claim, the 
claim "sounds in contract and is governed by the 
6-year statute of limitations for contracts"; at the 
same time, in deciding when the statute of 
limitations begins to run, we held it was "when the 
accident giving rise to die injury happens." Id. An 
Eighth Circuit case written by Judge Sanborn, 
Webber v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 97 F. 140 (8th 
Cir.1899), which has stood the test of time, is also 
instructive. There it was held that the estate of a 
plaintiff injured in a train accident who then died of 
unrelated causes could not evade the survival statute 
by alleging a cause of action for breach of contract 
to transport the plaintiff safely. Id. at 141. The 
contract claim, said the court, arose from an injury 
to the person and ended with that person's death. 
Id. at 145. 
[3] This much is clear. The test for survivability 
is in the substance, not the form, of the cause of 
action. Id. The test, said Webber, is whether 
breach of contract or injury to the person is the 
"primary and moving cause of the damages sought." 
Id. This is consistent with the test adopted in 
Fowlie v. First Minneapolis Trust Co., 184 Minn. 
82, 85, 237 N.W. 846, 847 (1931), where we said 
that "the nature of the damages sued for rather than 
the form of the remedy is the test." 
Another case which might be mentioned, and on 
which the Beaudrys rely, is Johnson v. Taylor, 435 
N.W.2d 127 (Minn.App. 1989). There an attorney 
breached the attorney-client contract by missing the 
personal injury statute of limitations, even though 
he had represented the injured client for almost the 
entire 6 years following the auto accident. When 
the plaintiff-client subsequently died of unrelated 
causes, the court of appeals held that his estate was 
not precluded by the survival statute from 
maintaining a legal malpractice action for the 
"economic loss to the estate." Id. at 128. The 
court of appeals reasoned that "the legal malpractice 
action arose from respondent's misconduct rather 
than from Johnson's personal injury." Id. at 129. 
Or in the language of Webber, we might *14 say 
that the legal malpractice was the primary cause of 
the plaintiff's damages, and that trial of the "lawsuit 
within the lawsuit," i.e., trial of the personal injury 
claim, was relatively incidental to the primary 
wrong visited on plaintiff by his attorney. 
This brings us, then, to the Beaudrys' case. The 
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Beaudrys argue that they are not seeking recovery 
for pain and suffering but rather enforcement of 
their contractual rights. They point out that prior 
to Alice Beaudry's death, her personal injury claim 
against the tortfeasor was concluded by settlement, 
so that at the time of her death all conditions 
precedent to bringing her UIM claim had been met; 
that her contract action had "matured"; and "there 
existed nothing but a contract cause of action 
against State Farm." (Respondent's emphasis.) 
We agree that at the time of Alice Beaudry's death 
her UIM claim was ready to be concluded and that 
her right to recover benefits from State Farm was 
based on the contractual provisions in her policy. 
But having said this, it is also true that Alice 
Beaudry had not liquidated her underinsured 
motorist claim by settlement, verdict, or award 
prior to her death. At the time of her death, the 
"liability under that coverage," see Mcintosh, 488 
N.W.2d at 479, still remained to be determined, 
and her UIM claim was still unresolved and 
pending. 
Significantly, State Farm's policy contractually 
bound the insurer to "pay damages for bodily injury 
an insured is legally entitled to collect from the 
owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle or 
underinsured motor vehicle." Put another way, the 
UIM claimant can collect from State Farm what the 
claimant could have collected in damages for bodily 
injury from the tortfeasor if the tortfeasor had not 
been underinsured. And that determination is 
directly dependent on the law governing "[a] cause 
of action arising out of an injury to the person." 
Minn.Stat. § 573.01 (1992). 
[4] We conclude that the primary cause of the 
damages sought to be recovered as UIM benefits is 
the injury Alice Beaudry suffered in the auto 
accident. The Beaudrys contend they are not 
seeking damages for pain and suffering, but this 
argument elevates form over substance. If the 
UIM claim can circumvent the survival statute, the 
UIM claimant recovers damages for pain and 
suffering up to her death. Under Fowlie, 184 
Minn, at 85, 237 N.W. at 847, we look to the 
nature of the damages sought rather than the form 
of the remedy. Under this test, it is inescapable 
that Alice Beaudry's claim, sounding primarily in 
tort for injury to the person, abated with her death. 
We must, therefore, reverse the contrary ruling of 
the court of appeals, thereby reinstating the trial 
court's summary judgment in favor of State Farm. 
We note, however, that the UIM claim of Alice 
Beaudry's estate for UIM benefits survives to the 
extent the underlying claim for "special damages" 
survives under Minn.Stat. § 573.02, subd. 2 (1992). 
Also, of course, William Beaudry's separate claim 
for UIM benefits for his own injuries is not 
involved in this appeal. 
Reversed. 
COYNE, J., took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
518N.W.2d 11 
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